Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/6
10 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

2000 NPT Review Conference

Working paper submitted by the United States of America

I. INTRODUCTION

Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the NPT states that the purpose of NPT Review Conferences is to "review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Parties "examined the implementation of article VIII. 3 of the Treaty" and, in their decision on the review process for the Treaty adopted on May 11, 1995, "agreed to strengthen the process."

Among other things, the Strengthened Review Decision decided:

> 4. "The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. . . . These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference."
>
> 5. "The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee. . . ."
>
> 6. "It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference."
>
> 7. "The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality."

II. DISCUSSION

Paragraph 7 of the Strengthened Review Decision makes clear that future review conferences should not only conduct a review but should also conduct a forward look. The United States believes that the 2000 Review Conference will have succeeded if it conducts a thorough review and if a constructive discussion of the future aspirations of the parties has occurred. The United States recognizes, as has been the case at all prior review conferences, that the 2000 NPT Review Conference will seek to produce documents that reflect what has occurred. The United States delegation pledges to work actively and constructively to achieve agreed documents. Set forth below are the views of the United States on (1) what documents the conference should seek to produce; (2) how the conference should organize itself to conduct the review and the future look; (3) the use to be made of preparatory committee products; and (4) views on subsidiary bodies.

A. Documents That the 2000 Review Conference Should Seek

The United States believes that the 2000 Review Conference should seek to produce two documents -- one document that is forward looking, and one that reflects the results of the review of the operation of the Treaty over the past five years. Such an approach, the United States believes, is the best way to give full meaning to Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, and paragraphs 4 and 7 of the 1995 Decision on Strengthened Review.

B. Organizing The Conference to Conduct the Forward Look and the Review

The strengthened review decision in 1995 leaves unclear how the Conference should be organized to conduct the forward and backward look. It does make clear in paragraph 5 of the Strengthened Review Decision, however, the general satisfaction with the three-committee structure that has been used at past NPT review conferences. Certainly, the United States sees no reason for departing from the three-committee structure.

In 1995, the Conference President assumed the responsibility for ensuring the production of a forward looking document, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." The Committee Chairmen had the responsibility for producing the review documents, and, as a practical matter, provided ideas and elements, as they emerged from discussions, for inclusion in the Principles and Objectives.

The United States suggests that the 2000 Review Conference should adopt a similar approach. The Conference President should have the responsibility for conducting the forward looking effort and seeking to produce a text that reflects the results of his efforts. This should be based on his consultations with delegations and on input from the three Main Committees. The President should periodically advise the full Conference of his efforts, for example, by convening the plenary in informal session or by calling a meeting of the General Committee. The three Main Committees should conduct a thorough review of all matters within their respective jurisdiction, making the President aware of elements that could usefully be included in the forward looking effort. Prior to formal action, adequate time would be set aside for consideration of the forward-look effort by the Plenary.

/...

This approach is meant to accomplish several things. First, by continuing the role of the Main Committees in identifying issues for the forward look, it ensures the widest possible cross section of views are available to the President. Second, by clearly deciding that the President has responsibility for the forward-looking effort, he can begin his task almost immediately rather than waiting until after the main committees have finished their work. And third, it ensures that all delegations can participate in all aspects of the Conference's work.

C. Use of the Products of Preparatory Committee Meetings

The United States believes that the Third Preparatory Committee, like the two which preceded it, should seek to identify agreed recommendations and compile a list of proposals where agreement has yet to be achieved, essentially building upon the Chairman's text produced by the First and Second Preparatory Committees. All agreed and unagreed recommendations and proposals should be forwarded to the Review Conference. At the Review Conference, the President should draw upon those recommendations or proposals that are appropriate for the look forward and the Chairmen of the Main Committees should utilize those that are within the jurisdiction of their respective committees.

D. Subsidiary Bodies

The United States has made clear that it has no objection to changing the rules of procedure to authorize Main Committees to create "subsidiary bodies" vice "working groups" as stated in the rules used by prior review conferences. The change of name does not imply any change in the status of these subsidiary bodies. First, they would only be created by one of the Main Committees and second they would only meet while the Main Committees are in existence, that is, only for the duration of the Review Conference. The United States delegation would strongly oppose any proposal to have these subordinate bodies meet between Review Conferences. Similarly, the United States has no problem in principle with the concept of the Main Committees establishing subsidiary bodies but only when it has been established that an issue cannot be effectively addressed in Main Committee deliberations.

In addition, there are many ramifications to creating a subsidiary body, which the United States Delegation believes must be considered on a case-by-case basis and which would affect our ability to agree that there is a demonstrable need for the creation of any particular subsidiary body. Among them are:

1. the potential effect on the purpose and effectiveness of the main committees;
2. the need for identifying a chairman;
3. financial implications (documentation, interpretation, etc.);
4. the impact of a multiplicity of meetings on small delegations; and
5 competition among delegations as to whose issues should be addressed in a subsidiary body.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/7
10 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Letter dated 7 May 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council from Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (see annex), concerning the view of the Arab League on the importance of including the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the final report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as a document of the Preparatory Committee.

(Signed) Abdallah BAALI

99-13568 (E) 110599 110599

/...

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States addressed to the President of the Security Council

In the light of the concern of the League of Arab States for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, and primarily nuclear weapons, from the Middle East region and in view of the fact that the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the [Review] Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [in the year 2000] is to be held in April 1999 in New York, I should like to inform you that, at the most recent session of the Council of the League, the Arab ministers for foreign affairs noted with concern that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty had not been included in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session, held in Geneva at the end of April 1998.

As you know, the League has endorsed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its objectives and has affirmed the importance of achieving universal accession thereto, without any exceptions. All of the Arab States have acceded to the Treaty and have undertaken to be fully bound by it and by its provisions as well as by the provisions of the resolution on the Middle East. Israel's failure to accede to the Treaty, its failure to declare any intention of doing so and its failure to submit its nuclear facilities to the safeguards regime, however, indicate a flaw in the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime's universality and its inability to safeguard international peace and security, particularly in the Middle East region.

In this context, we deem it important that the resolution on the Middle East should be included in the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the [Review] Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [in the year 2000] on its third session and that the States parties to the Treaty, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States that adopted this resolution, should be urged to make the greatest efforts for the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, and primarily nuclear weapons, in the region of the Middle East.

I am confident that you will spare no effort to achieve this goal in order to safeguard international peace and security, particularly in the Middle East, a region whose peoples aspire to the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.

(Signed) Ahmed Esmat ABDEL MEGUID
Secretary-General
of the League of Arab States

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/8
10 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

THE 1995 RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Working paper submitted by Algeria on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a package consisting of three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East.

The members of the League of Arab States, which are all parties to the Treaty, submitted two working papers on the resolution on the Middle East during the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference, which were held in New York in 1997 and in Geneva in 1998, respectively. The Arab States aim, by presenting this new paper, to reiterate vehemently their position pertaining to ways and means of ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

The adoption by consensus of a resolution on the Middle East sponsored by the three depository States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the fact that it was the only resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference concerning a specific region, is a clear expression by the States Parties of their concern over the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East resulting from the existence of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities in the region and ambiguous nuclear policies endangering regional and international peace and security.

Since May 1995, specific positive developments have taken place and should be taken into consideration. These are:

1. All States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty expect Israel, the only State in the region that is not yet party to the Treaty and has not declared its intention to become a party;

2. The continued adoption by consensus, for the nineteenth consecutive year, of a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

3. The ever-growing overwhelming support for General Assembly resolution 53/80, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which calls upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty and has not declared its intention to do so, to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This support reflects the increased concern of the international community resulting from the fact that Israel continues to defy repeated calls to accede to the Treaty;

4. The unanimous adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its 1999 substantive session, of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, where the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass destruction was encouraged.

Despite the fact that all Arab States are in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty as well as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, it remains evident that their accession to the Treaty did not provide them with the necessary security requirements in the wake of the continuing Israeli nuclear threat and its defiance of the repeated calls of the international community, most notably its flagrant defiance of Security Council resolution 487 (1981), by refusing to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. It must be recalled that the Arab delegations at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference clearly voiced this concern at the time of the adoption of the 1995 package outcome as a whole.

The readiness demonstrated by the Arab States to take practical steps towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective in accordance with paragraph 5 of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as well as paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) should not go unnoticed.

The 2000 Review Conference, pursuant to paragraph 7 of the 1995 decision 1, on the strengthening of the review process, should look forward as well as back and evaluate the results of the period under review, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

It is therefore imperative that the Preparatory Committee address this important issue with a view to redressing the existing imbalance prevailing in the Middle East region. This third session of the Preparatory Committee should include in its report a solemn declaration to the 2000 Review Conference urging Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

All States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have to shoulder their responsibilities, extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the said resolution. The role of the three depository States in fulfilling their primary responsibilities as sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is crucial in implementing faithfully and achieving the goals of the resolution on the Middle East. They are requested to indicate at this Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference the measures they have taken to ensure the full implementation of the resolution and the realization of its objectives.

The nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty, are requested to undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and to further undertake not to in any way assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

All States parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, should declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

The Arab States recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The members of the League of Arab States reaffirm once again, their determination to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from nuclear weapons as an important step towards the realization of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. All States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have to extend their cooperation to achieve the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9
11 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

DRAFT PROTOCOL ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Working paper submitted by South Africa

Preamble

The States parties to this Protocol,

Being also parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 (hereinafter called 'the Treaty'),

Convinced that every effort must be made to avoid and avert the danger of nuclear war, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries, and reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty to these efforts, **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Taking into consideration the legitimate concern of non-nuclear weapon States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty, further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security, **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Recognising the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive security assurances, **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Reaffirming the need for all States parties to the Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Reaffirming also the importance of the Treaty and the need for the full implementation and achievement of all of its provisions,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control, **(Taken from the Principles and Objectives)**

Have decided and hereby agree as follows:

Article I

1. The nuclear-weapon States parties to this Protocol undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty. **(Taken from security assurances statements by NWS of April 1995)**

2. The State parties to this Protocol undertake, individually or collectively, to take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty which is a victim of the use of nuclear weapons. **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Article II

1. The security assurance provided for in terms of article I(1) of this Protocol shall be provided by the nuclear-weapon State parties as defined in terms of article IX(3) of the Treaty.

2. The States receiving the security assurance provided for in terms of article I(1) shall be non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty which are in compliance with their obligations under Article II of the Treaty. **(Taken from security assurances statements by NWS of April 1995)**

3. The security assurance provided for in terms of article I(1) shall cease to apply in the event of an invasion or any other armed attack on a nuclear-weapon State's territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. **(Taken from security assurances statements by NWS of April 1995)**

Article III

1. The State parties to this Protocol undertake to cooperate with the Security Council of the United Nations in the event of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Security Council shall consider measures in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations to address such an act or action. **(Taken from UNSCR 984(1995))**

Article IV

1. This Protocol shall be signed and shall be open for signature by any State party to the Treaty. It shall be subject to ratification.

2. This Protocol shall enter into force for each State party on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

3. This Protocol shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely.

4. This Protocol shall not be subject to reservations.

5. Any amendments to the Protocol proposed by a State party shall follow the same procedure as provided for in article VIII(1) and (2) of the Treaty.

6. Each State party to the Protocol shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Protocol in accordance with the provisions as provided for in article X(1) of the Treaty.

7. The operation and effectiveness of this Protocol shall be reviewed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty.

Article V

1. This Protocol, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Depository Governments of the Treaty. Duly certified copies of this Protocol shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory States.

2. **IN WITNESS WHEREOF** the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Protocol.

3. **DONE** in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the ... day of ...

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/10
12 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Position Paper re Article VI

Working paper submitted by Canada

Purpose:

- The purpose of this paper is to affirm our understanding of Article VI as negotiated in the Treaty, i.e. the undertaking "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" is an obligation of all States party and is not contingent upon negotiations towards general and complete disarmament.

- This underlines our deep concerns relating to possible interpretations of sub-paragraphs seven and eleven of paragraph one of the Chairman's Working Paper (N.P.T./Conf 2000/PCII/35 of 9 June 1998).

Canadian Position:

- Article VI of the Treaty records two undertakings by States party:

  - "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...";

  - "and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

- These are two distinct undertakings; the first is not conditional to achievement of the second.

- These are both undertakings by all States party, not only by some thereof.

99-13798 (E) 120599

- Canada is prepared to acknowledge the primary responsibility of the five nuclear-weapon states for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons..." (paragraph 4c of Principles and Objectives 1995).

- This does not imply any derogation of Canada's obligations under Article VI; our continuing advocacy of nuclear disarmament (and nuclear non-proliferation), our call for relevant engagement in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere on nuclear disarmament issues, and our support for focused consideration in the NPT Strengthened Review Process of the implementation of Article VI reflect this.

- The negotiating history of the NPT supports this view, e.g. USA Representative Adrian S. Fisher stated on January 18, 1968, in the Geneva Conference that Article VI constituted a "solid affirmation of the responsibility of nuclear-weapon states to strive for effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. Moreover, the article does not make the negotiation of those measures conditional upon their inclusion within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" (emphasis added).

- The Treaty itself does not support conditionality, e.g. paragraph 8 of the Preamble states clearly the intention of the States concluding the Treaty.

- Subsequent practice confirms this position, e.g. the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament consistently presents "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" as a distinct agenda item separate from any agenda reference to 'general and complete disarmament' or to 'comprehensive programme of disarmament'.

- The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of July 1996 stated unanimously

> "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

- Studies elsewhere underwrite the Canadian position.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/11
12 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Amendment to paragraph 100 of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35)

Proposed by New Zealand

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

100. The States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than **150** countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. The States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. **Pending the Treaty's entry into force, the States parties call on those States that have not yet done so to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests.**

99-13843 (E) 120599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/12
12 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Working paper submitted by Egypt

Egypt believes, in terms of the strengthened review process and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the three decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, that the Preparatory Committee meetings up to and including the 2000 Review Conference should engage in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the faithful fullfilment of all commitments and undertakings in the package outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The 2000 Review Conference hence, pursuant to paragraph 7 of the 1995 decision 1 on the strengthening of the review process, should look forward as well as backward and evaluate the results of the period under review, including the implemenation of undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty and identify the areas in which, and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

To date, the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is far from being implemented. The working paper submitted by Algeria on behalf of the States Members of the League of Arab States clearly reflects the current state of affairs of the staggering situation prevailing in the Middle East. Moreover, the working paper submitted by Indonesia on behalf of NAM contains specific draft recommendations related to the Resolution on the Middle East to be considered by the Preparatory Committee. Furthermore, the working paper submitted by Egypt to the second

session of the Preparatory Committee held in Geneva in 1998 has identified the areas in which, and the means through which further progress should be sought and achieved for the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East.

Egypt considers that it is now incumbent on this third session of the Preparatory Committee to seriously address the issues pertaining to the full implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East. To this end, Egypt views the following draft recommendations as essential elements to be included in the report of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 Review Conference at which the establishment of a subsidiary body to its main committee II is imperative for indepth consideration and the recommendation of concrete proposals aimed at the full implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East:

Articles I and II

- The States Parties note with deep concern the alarm expressed over the nuclear capabilities of Israel, which continues to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and persists in pursuing its ambiguous nuclear programmes and policies.

- The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to the provisions of articles I and II of the Treaty, both of which allow for no exceptions whatsoever, and are binding on them in times of peace as well as in times of war.

- The nuclear-weapon-States solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

Article III

- The States Parties remain convinced that the universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a vital step towards strengthening barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to this end they call upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East that is not yet party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, to acceed to the Treaty immediately and unconditionally without further delay.

Article IV

- The States Parties undertake to suspend all forms and any kind of cooperation or assistance which would contribute to the nuclear programme of Israel, and hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know how or assistance, in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards.

- The States Parties further call upon Israel to acceed to the Treaty, to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards and to pledge itself not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices.

Article VII

- The States Parties welcome the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. They urge all States directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

- The States Parties reaffirm the provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and also reaffirm their determination to strive towards its speedy implementation. They undertake to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from nuclear weapons as an important prior step towards the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/13
12 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

LETTER DATED 12 MAY 1999 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

On behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, I have the honour to request that you include General Assembly resolution 53/77 Y as an official document of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

(Signed) Michael HOEY

99-13940 (E) 120599

ANNEX

General Assembly resolution 53/77 Y

TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGENDA

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Concerned at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons,

Concerned also at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[2]

Believing that the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used accidentally or by decision defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,

Concerned that the nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled speedily and totally their commitment to the elimination of their nuclear weapons,

Concerned also that those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have failed to renounce their nuclear-weapons option,

Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Stressing that the international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, and convinced that the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time,

Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those nuclear-weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and stressing that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those nuclear-weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,

Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Believing that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place, and, in this connection, noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,

Welcoming the agreement recently reached in the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator[33] and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing that, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Emphasizing also the importance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,

Noting the joint ministerial declaration of 9 June 1998[1] and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,

1. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and, without delay, to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;[2]

2. Calls upon the United States of America and the Russian Federation to bring the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)[52] into force without further delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;

---

[1] A/53/138, annex.

3. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

4. Also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities;

5. Further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and, in turn, to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;

6. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines;

7. Calls upon those three States that are nuclear-weapon capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

8. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument;

9. Also calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997;[2]

10. Further calls upon those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty[3] and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;

11. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material[4] and to work towards its further strengthening;

12. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to pursue its negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee established under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation

---

[2] See IAEA/GOV/2914, attachment 1.

[3] See resolution 50/245.

[4] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1456, No. 24631.

instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

20. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

21. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session an item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution.

79th plenary meeting
4 December 1998

---

of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator[5] and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to conclude these negotiations without delay, and, pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

13. Also calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;

14. Considers that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world;

15. Recalls the importance of the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[6] and underlines the importance of implementing fully the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty;

16. Affirms that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons, and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with any other relevant international organizations and bodies, to explore the elements of such a system;

17. Calls for the conclusion of an internationally legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

18. Stresses that the pursuit, extension and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

19. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding

---

[5] CD/1299.

[6] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/14
13 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Amendments to the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35)
(to replace text in paragraphs 58 to 60)

Submitted by New Zealand

1. **The nuclear weapon States demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay agree to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).** [replace para. 58]

2. **The nuclear weapon States recognise the importance of undertaking the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.** [replace para. 59]

3. **The nuclear weapon States acknowledge the need to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiation on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities.** [replace para. 59]

4. **The nuclear weapon States, as an interim measure, manifest their commitment to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and in turn to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.** [replace para. 59]

5. The States parties **confirm** that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. [replace para. 60]

6. **The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a goal to reaching such a decision without delay.** [replace para. 60]

Note: New language in bold.

99-14030 (E) 130599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/15
13 May 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for Inclusion in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by China

Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference:

1. To promote the smooth development of the disarmament process and safeguard world peace and security, all States Parties commit themselves to cultivate a new security concept in line with the need of the times. The core of such concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.

2. To ensure real progress in nuclear disarmament and reach the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as early as possible, all States

99-14039 (E) 130599

/...

parties should strive to establish a just and fair new international political and economic order, renounce cold war mentality, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power politics and the pursuit of absolute military superiority. All States Parties reaffirm to respect one anther' s sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations, oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries under any pretext, and never resort to military force in the international relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council.

3. To promote the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, it is imperative to adhere to the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and the principle of undiminished security for every country, as well as ensuring an international environment of peace, security, stability and trust favorable for the continued progress in nuclear disarmament.

4. All States Parties should refrain from engaging in the research or development of missile defense system, which could upset global and regional strategic stability and balance or trigger off a new round of arms race. All States Parties should also refrain from transferring missile defense technology and equipment to other countries, so as to prevent the proliferation of missile and missile technology that could deliver weapons of mass destruction. No State Party should use missile defense program to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, impair their sovereignty or threaten their security.

5. The prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are mutually complimentary and promotive. The thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is the objective, and the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation one of the effective means and necessary steps to attain this goal. In order to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons so as to free the mankind forever from the threat of nuclear war,

--the relevant nuclear weapon States should renounce the nuclear deterrence policy characterized by " the first use of nuclear weapons" ;

--the U.S.A and the Russian Federation, bearing special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, should continue to cut down drastically their respective nuclear arsenals;

--all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil should be withdrawn to their owner' s territory;

--all the nuclear weapon States should, as soon as possible, undertake unconditionally and in a legally-binding manner not to be the first to use unclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded to this effect;

--all States Parties and the whole international community should push for the early entry into force of CTBT in accordance with its provisions, the negotiation and conclusion of a universal and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty as soon as possible, and on the basis of the above-mentioned measures, negotiations to conclude a convention completely banning all the nuclear weapons.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/16
13 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

Working paper submitted by Norway

The following wording to be included in the Chairman's working paper:

" The entire field of weapons usable fissile material needs to be addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to establish an international norm to define obligations and guide actions for states in dealing with weapons usable fissile material.

In addition to a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the following issues should be dealt with:

1. Establishing a parallel multilateral process regarding stockpiles related to excess weapons material and highly enriched uranium for non-explosive purposes.

2. Establishing a multilateral process regarding stockpiles related to military inventories through provisions for voluntary measures with a view to increased transparency and confidence-building. "

99-14071 (E) 130599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/17
14 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

CLUSTER II: ARTICLE VII

Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its Third session

Working paper submitted by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan

1. The "Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference encouraged the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as a matter of priority. Since 1995, two additional nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established, respectively in Southeast Asia and Africa. The Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba continue to make an important contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime while also representing a significant step toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control. After the Pelindaba Treaty's entry into force, nuclear-weapon-free zones will cover the entire Southern Hemisphere, in addition to Antarctica, the seabed, and outer space with 114 member-states.

2. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are unanimous in their belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world contributes substantially to nuclear disarmament and promotes the strengthening of peace and stability at the regional and global levels. Recent events in South Asia have underscored the importance of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime at a time when it faces serious challenges. They also demonstrate the importance of regional approaches to disarmament and nonproliferation, which can strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

99-14164 (E) 140599

3. The Preparatory Committee notes with satisfaction that on 9 December 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 53/77 A, "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia" by consensus, which calls on all states to support the initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, commends the first concrete steps taken by the Central Asian states to create the legal groundwork to support their initiative, and requests the UN Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Central Asian states as they prepare the form and elements of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

4. The Preparatory Committee also welcomes the concrete steps taken by the Central Asian states toward implementing the Almaty Declaration of the heads of State of the Central Asian States of 28 February 1997 and the Statement issued in Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. These steps have included expert-level meetings in Geneva, Bishkek and Tashkent. The Bishkek meeting held on 9-10 July 1998 included experts from the nuclear weapon states (P-5), the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while the Tashkent meeting held on 1-3 February 1999 and the Geneva meetings included UN and IAEA representatives. As a result of these meetings, significant progress has been made toward drafting a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The Central Asian states welcome the continued assistance of interested international organizations and states as they move forward with this process. It is the sincere hope of the five Central Asian states that the treaty establishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will be completed and ready for signature at the earliest date possible.

5. The Preparatory Committee also recalls the report of Main Committee III of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which notes that there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference's call upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/18
14 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

Some draft elements on Principles and Objectives and Programme of Actions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

Proposed by Myanmar

The delegation of Myanmar favours the adoption by the Review Conference of a set of decisions and one resolution.

There could be two decisions or more and one resolution. In any case, they include, inter alia,

- decision on the further strengthened review process;

- decision on principles and objectives and one programme of actions (POPA) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament ; and

- resolution on the Middle East.

The following are some draft elements, proposed by the delegation of Myanmar: -

Universality

Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains to be an urgent priority.

The States Parties welcome the nine recent accessions to the Treaty. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

The State Parties reaffirm their view that effective measures for nuclear disarmament will contribute towards the realization of the goal of the universality of adherence to the Treaty.

Non-proliferation

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all possible efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty.

They recognize that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are complementary to one another and that effective nuclear disarmament measures will contribute to the maintenance of an effective regime of nuclear non-proliferation.

Nuclear disarmament

The States Parties reaffirm the great importance they attach to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

They recognize that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the human civilization and that the best and the only genuinely effective defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of these weapons.

All States Parties reaffirm their firm commitment to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

They also reaffirm that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

While they appreciate the important role of bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament between the Nuclear Weapon States, they recognize the need to multilateralize negotiations on nuclear disarmament in view of the global nature of the problem.

In this context, they call for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament at

an early date and the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of these weapons.

The achievement of the following measures is important for the full realization of nuclear disarmament and effective implementation of Article VI, including the effective actions as reflected below; -

(a) the early entry into force of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty, not later than ---- ;

(b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not later than ---- ; and

(c) other crucial arm control measures for the reduction of nuclear danger such as de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons and a joint undertaking by the Nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and further measures of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.

Security assurances

The States Parties reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding international instrument on a security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.

The States Parties recognize that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to receive legally-binding security assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

The States Parties reaffirm their firm commitments to take further steps which could take the form of an internationally and legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The States Parties reaffirm their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

In this respect, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Palindeba have gone a long way in limiting the geographic proliferation of nuclear weapons and in enhancing global and regional peace and security.

The cooperation of all the Nuclear Weapon States and their respect and support for the respective protocols are necessary for the maximum effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones and their respective protocols.

The States Parties express their desire to see an early entry into force of the protocols which still remain to be ratified by the Nuclear Weapon States through the resolution of the remaining issues in a spirit of amity and cooperation in the shortest possible times.

These are some thoughts and proposals of the Myanmar delegation on the format and substance of the document to be adopted by the 2000 Review Conference. It is hoped that these proposed draft elements will be useful inputs to the preparatory work of this PrepCom for the Review Conference.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/19
14 May 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for Inclusion in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by China

Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear-weapon-free Zones

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference:

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. In order to achieve the objective set out in NPT for preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, States parties should work for the building-up of a just and fair new international political and economic order, and strive to do away with hegemonism, power politics and the nuclear deterrence strategy characterized by "the first use of nuclear weapons". In this way, all countries would feel secure, thus removing the fundamental incentives to acquire, develop or retain nuclear weapons.

2.To achieve the NPT's objective of nuclear weapon non-proliferation, the practice of double standards or multi-standards must be opposed, bloc export control arrangements should be replaced by non-discriminatory and universally negotiated multilateral treaties.

99-14195 (E) 140599

Safeguards

All States parties should support the IAEA program for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, conclude agreement with IAEA on the application of the model protocol and implement these agreements as soon as possible. IAEA should promote its work in safeguards and in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a balanced way.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

1. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary consultations and arrangements freely arrived at is conducive to the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations, including the legal obligation towards the nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the unconditional obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, if they are States parties to other international or regional agreements at the same time, should ensure that their observance of other international or regional agreements do not contradict their obligations to the treaty establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone.

3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should constitute a geographical entity whose boundaries are to be clearly defined by the prospective States parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty through full consultations with other States concerned, especially in cases where territories in dispute are involved, with a view to facilitating agreement of the other States concerned.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/20
14 May 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

PROPOSALS BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR INCLUSION IN THE CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER

The States parties deem it necessary to resolve the questions of enhancing the safety of nuclear power on the basis of new, intrinsically safe nuclear-power technologies.

In this connection, the States parties propose the elaboration, under the auspices of IAEA, of an international draft on the consideration of the possibility of creating forward-looking nuclear technologies which would ensure that energy is obtained with minimal risk from the point of view of non-proliferation.

99-14225 (E) 140599 140599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/21
17 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine propose that the following elements be included in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the section on Nuclear Disarmament

The States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership among the States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the voluntary decision of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

The international community welcomes the signing on 26 September 1997 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of a number of significant agreements that contribute to ensuring the viability of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

The States parties welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfillment of their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, and note with satisfaction the current efforts of those States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.

99-14315 (E) 170599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/22
17 May 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for Inclusion in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working Paper Submitted by China

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference:

1. To negotiate and conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will be conducive to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.

2. Only mutually coordinated and jointly implemented with other nuclear disarmament measures, will FMCT be meaningful for achieving the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

3. The commencement, progress and conclusion of FMCT negotiations are closely related to the development of international peace and security. With a view to early negotiation and conclusion of FMCT and promoting the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, all the States parties to NPT should:

--strive to establish a just and fair new international political and economic order, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power politics and the pursuit of absolute military superiority in international relations;

--respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations, oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries under any pretext, and never resort to military force in international relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council;

--refrain from engaging in the research, development and deployment of space weapon systems and missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability;

--call upon the relevant nuclear weapon States to renounce the nuclear deterrence policy characterized by "first use of nuclear weapons", and withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil to their owner's territory;

--request all the nuclear weapon States unconditionally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded to this effect.

4. In line with the above-mentioned measures, the Conference on Disarmament should commence negotiations in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon report, with a view to concluding a universal and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

5. FMCT should only prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. The production of fissile material for other military or civilian uses should not be prohibited.

6. The verification measures of FMCT should be determined in accordance with the scope of the treaty as set out by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, rather than copying the verification models of other treaties or conventions.

7. The future FMCT requires universality, with all the nuclear-capable States joining in the treaty.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/23
17 May 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

Third Session
New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for Inclusion in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working Paper Submitted by China

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion in the report of the third session of the preparatory committee for the 2000 review conference:

1. The practical enhancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will contribute to full implementation of all objectives of NPT, and play a significant promotive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Relevant work in this regard is an important part towards full implementation of NPT, and should be concretely undertaken.

2. In the fulfillment of the obligations of NPT regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the tendency to restrict or even to impede the right of the developing countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation should be opposed and terminated.

3. A few countries have established export control regimes which are beyond NPT and discriminatory and exclusive in nature. Under various pretexts, they adopt double standards and impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the relevant international cooperation by the States Parties to NPT, especially the developing countries. Such acts should be opposed, because it will undermine the basis for the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation. The bloc-oriented export control regimes should be replaced by globally universal non-proliferation regimes established through multilateral negotiations.

4. It is imperative for IAEA to strengthen its work in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA should not over-emphasize the safeguards function at the expense of its work to promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

99-14478 (E) 170599

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/24
17 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 to 21 May 1999

REVISED ESTIMATED COST OF THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Note by the Secretariat

1. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998, the Committee noted the cost estimates as presented by the Secretariat and contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/1. The Secretariat submits below a revised summary of the estimated costs of the 2000 Review Conference, including the meetings of its Preparatory Committee.

A. Revised estimated conference-servicing costs

2. The revised estimates of the conference-servicing costs provided below relate to the costs of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and of the 2000 Review Conference. The actual costs incurred for servicing the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee are $306,278 and $436,900, respectively. The final actual cost of conference services provided for the 2000 Review Conference, including its preparatory process, will depend on the total actual workload arising from all three sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference.

3. The revised estimates have been compiled taking into account the decision of the Preparatory Committee, at its first session, that the working languages for the Conference and its preparation would be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, para. 9 (b) (iii) and (iv)). It also decided that summary records would be provided at each session of the Committee's opening meeting, the general debate and the closing meetings, a total of five meetings, and that there would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings. Without prejudice to an eventual decision by the Preparatory Committee, the estimates include the provision of summary records for the 2000 Review Conference itself.

4. The estimates provided in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/1 included costs involved in anticipation of a request that was to be made by the Preparatory Committee at its second session to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional intergovernmental

organizations to prepare a number of background papers. In view of the fact that a decision by the Committee is still pending, the estimates were revised accordingly, anticipating that such a decision will be taken by the Committee at its third session. The revised estimates take into account the costs involved in the preparation and processing of those papers, it being understood that the final costs related to background documentation will depend on the total actual number of pages produced in that connection.

5. In view of the aforementioned, conference-servicing requirements have been revised as follows:

	Initial estimates	Revised estimates
	(United States dollars)	
First session of the Preparatory Committee (New York, 7-18 April 1997) (actual cost)	306 300	306 300
Second session of the Preparatory Committee (Geneva, 27 April-8 May 1998) (actual cost)	564 800	436 900
Third session of the Preparatory Committee (New York, 10-21 May 1999)	749 300	605 500
2000 Review Conference (New York, 24 April-19 May 2000)	2 205 000	2 468 700
Total[a]	3 825 400	3 817 400

[a] Rounded to the nearest $100.

6. A breakdown of conference-servicing costs incurred for the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the revised estimated conference-servicing costs of holding the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference itself is set out in section I of the annex to the present document.

B. Revised estimated non-conference-servicing costs

7. The significance of the 2000 Review Conference and its preparatory process necessitates the involvement of an adequate number of Secretariat staff. Requirements associated with staff costs have been revised and are estimated at a minimal level of $118,000. They would cover (a) provision under temporary assistance for clerk-typist support for 12 work-months, to assist in all administrative arrangements related to the Conference; and (b) travel and subsistence allowance of (i) four staff from the Department for Disarmament Affairs in connection with servicing of the second session of the Preparatory Committee; (ii) one staff from the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in connection with servicing the third session and the

Review Conference; and (iii) two staff from IAEA in connection with servicing the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference.

8. In accordance with practice followed for other Treaty Conferences, the revised estimates include an amount of $4,200 to provide for the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference to be approved by the Conference and would cover special post allowance and representation allowance.

9. As mentioned in paragraph 4 above, it is anticipated that the Preparatory Committee would request the preparation of a number of background papers dealing with the various aspects of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Preparation of such documents is estimated to require a total of six work-months. It is clear from prior experience that the writing of the papers will require the involvement of outside experts. The original estimated requirement of $61,800 for consultant fees, as well as for travel and subsistence allowance in connection with an initial and final discussion of the papers with the Secretariat in New York, has been maintained.

10. Considerable interest is expected to be generated among the press and other media representatives in the 2000 Review Conference. In order to ensure adequate press coverage of the plenary meetings of the Conference and the production of a press kit (including background information and a chronology of Conferences of Parties to the Treaty) in English and French the estimates have been revised to $72,000. Provision for miscellaneous supplies and services to cover the cost of stationery, office supplies and communications costs estimated at $6,000 have been reduced to $5,600.

11. Revised estimated non-conference-servicing costs, reflecting the actual costs incurred at the first and second sessions and the expected costs of servicing the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference, are described below and a corresponding breakdown is set out in section II of the annex.

	Initial estimates	Revised estimates
	(United States dollars)	
Travel and daily subsistence allowance in respect of substantive staff from the Department for Disarmament Affairs and IAEA	62 800	60 880
Secretary-General of the Conference	15 800	4 200
Fees and travel of consultants	61 800	61 800
Temporary assistance	75 900	57 100
Press coverage and public information activities	51 800	72 000
Miscellaneous supplies and services	6 000	5 600
Total	274 100	261 600

C. Revised estimated programme support costs

12. Practice followed in the United Nations levies a charge, at a rate of 13 per cent of expenditures, for activities such as the 2000 Review Conference financed from extrabudgetary sources, to defray administrative and other support costs incurred in their implementation. Accordingly, a provision of $530,300 is included in the estimates to offset administrative and other support costs incurred for the servicing of the 2000 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

D. Aggregation of the revised estimates of conference- and non-conference-servicing costs of the 2000 Review Conference and the three sessions of its Preparatory Committee

	Aggregated revised estimates (United States dollars)
Preparatory Committee	
First session (actual)	346 100
Second session (actual)	521 400
Third session	798 700
2000 Review Conference	2 943 100
Total[a]	4 609 300

[a] All totals are rounded to the nearest $100.

13. The total revised costs provided in the present note are estimated on the basis of past experience and anticipated workload. Actual costs such as those reported for the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee will be determined after the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the closure of the Conference when the actual workload is known. At that time, it is expected that adjustments warranted in the contributions by the participating States parties will be made accordingly.

14. Since the costs associated with the preparation and holding of the 2000 Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee should not have financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations, deposits into the United Nations accounts by States parties are required in accordance with the United Nations financial rule 114.3 (b). In line with past practice, assessment letters were sent to the participating States parties in July 1998 based on the overall estimated costs for the Conference, including its Preparatory Committee, and the schedule of the division of costs agreed to by the Committee at its second session (see NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/36, para. 14 (c)). The financial situation of the United Nations requires that provision by the Secretariat of the required support to the Conference and its Preparatory Committee be dependent on advance contributions by the States parties. As at 30 April 1999, advance contributions in the amount of $2,591,122.83 towards meeting the costs of the 2000 Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee, had already been made.

ANNEX

Revised estimates of conference- and non-conference-servicing costs of the 2000 Review Conference and the second to third sessions of its Preparatory Committee, plus actual costs of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee

(United States dollars)

		First session of the Preparatory Committee[a]	Second session of the Preparatory Committee[a]	Third session of the Preparatory Committee[b]	2000 Review Conference[b]	Total[c]
I.	Conference-servicing costs					
A.	Pre-session, in-session and post session documentation (Geneva and New York)	205 045	268 704	182 300	514 300	1 170 300
B.	Meeting services (Geneva and New York)	80 245	92 110	131 300	525 000	828 700
C.	Summary records (Geneva and New York)	20 988	57 808	280 200	1 121 000	1 480 000
D.	Background papers to be prepared and translated by IAEA	-	-	-	261 500	261 500
E.	Other requirements	-	18 275	11 700	46 900	76 900
	Total I[c]	306 300	436 900	605 500	2 468 700	3 817 400
II.	Non-conference-servicing costs					
A.	Travel and daily subsistence allowance of substantive staff from the Department for Disarmament Affairs and IAEA	-	23 880	18 500	18 500	60 880

	First session of the Preparatory Committee[a]	Second session of the Preparatory Committee[a]	Third session of the Preparatory Committee[b]	2000 Review Conference[b]	Total[c]
B. Secretary-General of the Conference Special posts allowance and representation allowance	-	-	-	4 200	4 200
C. Consultants Fees (6 work-months), travel and daily subsistence allowance	-	-	61 800	-	61 800
D. Temporary assistance (12 work-months)	-	-	19 000	38 100	57 100
E. Press coverage and public information activities	-	-	-	72 000	72 000
F. Miscellaneous supplies and services	-	638	2 000	3 000	5 600
Total II	-	24 500	108 300	135 800	261 600
Total (I+II)	306 300	461 400	706 800	2 604 500	4 079 000
III. Programme support costs	39 819	59 982	91 884	338 585	530 270
Grand total (I+II+III)	346 100	521 400	798 700	2 943 100	4 609 300

[a] Actual cost.

[b] Estimate.

[c] Figures rounded to the nearest $100.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/25
17 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

THIRD SESSION OF THE NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

Working Paper submitted by Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands,South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Background

In 1995 the States parties extended the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The Review Process for the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and Objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty were adopted.

The Decisions and Resolution adopted in 1995 were taken against the promise heralded by a new era of international cooperation. It was concluded that "nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the Cold War." It was agreed that undertakings on nuclear disarmament should thus be fulfilled with determination. To this end a *programme of action* was adopted which it was agreed was important in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI. Moreover, the nuclear weapon States re-affirmed their commitment under Article VI "to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament".

99-14536 (E) 170599

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the following year, concluded unanimously that: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

The Balance Sheet

The balance sheet in meeting the nuclear disarmament objectives set in 1995 is not, however, satisfactory. The CTBT has been concluded but, regrettably, negotiations on a fissile materials treaty are not taking place. Nor is an internationally legally binding instrument on negative security assurances yet in prospect.

The immediate commencement and rapid conclusion of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty is an outstanding priority. So too is the entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT as well as the strict observance of its purposes and provisions. The further pursuit of negative security assurances must be maintained.

Regionally there has been some progress in the further development of nuclear weapon free zones, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas from such weapons.

There have been severe setbacks in South Asia where non-proliferation objectives have been blatantly disregarded. The situation in the Middle East remains of the utmost concern. Activities in the Korean Peninsula require on-going and close attention.

On the other side of the ledger, there is the potential of the bilateral START process. There have been welcome steps by some nuclear weapon States which will facilitate in due course their seamless integration into nuclear force reduction negotiations. But ratification of START II is unfortunately frozen. This in turn is blocking the commencement of negotiations on START III.

Conclusions

In reviewing all these developments, the overwhelming conclusion must be that the pace of efforts to implement all the obligations of the NPT is faltering. As a consequence, negotiations on the measures required to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are in serious deficit.

Of profound concern is the lack of evidence that the nuclear weapon States consider their treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons consistent with the Article VI obligations and the 1995 Principles and Objectives. On the contrary, the continued possession of nuclear weapons has been re-rationalised. Nuclear doctrines have been reaffirmed. This is happening at a time when the States parties have all agreed to work with determination for their elimination.

The indefinite extension of the NPT does not sanction the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. That must be absolutely clear. There can be no question of entering the next millennium with the prospect that the retention of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future.

It must be stressed that all the articles of the NPT are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.

The NPT non-nuclear weapon States have entered into an obligation to forego the nuclear weapons option. That decision was made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapons States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

This fundamental and virtually universal bargain struck in the NPT is not being pursued. Its clear and unambiguous obligations are not being fulfilled with sufficient vigour. A world order whereby one group of five States can indefinitely retain nuclear weapons while more than one hundred and eighty States refrain from acquiring them in conformity with the same treaty is not acceptable. There must be a significant and visible acceleration in the process of elimination and a better balance in expectations.

It is inherent too in any treaty based on mutually agreed obligations that no one group of States can determine independently the pace with which the obligations of that treaty are implemented. It will no longer suffice in 2000 to rehearse the indefinite goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is imperative to secure a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination of these weapons.

The Way Ahead

Consistent with this unequivocal commitment it will be necessary to agree on such measures as are required to reduce the nuclear threat at the earliest date and to fully implement the Treaty in

all its aspects. These measures must form the elements of a process of irreversibly ridding the world of nuclear weapons for all time. They will have to be realistic and achievable.

There will need to be a fine balance between bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral efforts, which should be mutually reinforcing and which should be pursued in concert. The continuing pursuit of the START process is fundamental and we urge the United States and the Russian Federation to overcome current obstacles to this process. The other nuclear weapon States should take the necessary steps towards their seamless integration into the process leading to the elimination of their nuclear weapons. The total and final elimination of nuclear weapons will require a multilateral agreement.

There are also a number of interim measures which should be addressed by the nuclear weapon States with a view to reducing the nuclear threat and de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies. These include:

- the de-alerting of nuclear weapons and the removal of warheads from delivery vehicles;

- the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the early examination of measures to enhance strategic stability and to review strategic doctrines accordingly;

- the development of a legally binding instrument against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT, so-called Negative Security Assurances.

Transparency by all nuclear weapon States about their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stocks and the placing under IAEA safeguards of materials surplus to requirements should be addressed.

Only four States remain outside the NPT. Three of them possess nuclear weapons capabilities. In the past year, two of these States have engaged in nuclear testing and they have echoed rationales for "minium credible deterrence". A third is the only State remaining outside the NPT in its region. All these States are called upon to accede to the NPT unconditionally and without delay and to promptly place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Those States that have not yet done so are called upon to swiftly sign and/or ratify the CTBT unconditionally and without delay and, pending the Treaty's entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear testing.

It is essential that all the existing and fundamental bilateral and multilateral instruments that make up the international security architecture be maintained and upheld.

All these steps would constitute elements of an agenda for 2000 and beyond. They are not exhaustive. There have been other constructive suggestions on the critical elements that must be addressed.

Resolution 53/77Y adopted in the General Assembly in 1998 by a large majority of Member States of the United Nations and therefore by a large majority of the parties to this Treaty sets out an agenda that will need to be pursued to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Given the support which the international community has already given to the consideration of these proposals, they should guide States parties in their formulation of objectives that need to be considered for the forward-looking products the Prepcom or Review Conference will produce.

The NPT remains as indispensable as ever, but there must be a demonstrable shift in policy and commitment to a reinvigorated disarmament process.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26
18 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session
New York, 10 - 21 May 1999

Working paper submitted by Malaysia

Proposal for the Establishment of a High Level Consultation Mechanism

The High Level Consultation Mechanism hereby proposed would provide the highest political intervention to address specific issues, which would be decided by States parties at its annual Preparatory Committee meetings or its 5-yearly Review Conferences.

High Level Consultation Meeting Towards Universality of the Treaty

Introduction

There exists a need to find constructive and innovative ideas in order to actively promote the universality of the Treaty, the cornerstone of international peace and security. It is the responsibility of all NPT States parties to pursue activities aimed at the eventual universality of the Treaty.

Ongoing efforts regarding the promotion of universality are welcomed. There are, however, inevitable stumbling blocks which occasionally appear and are difficult to surmount. With this in mind, an appropriate mechanism should be sought in order to complement and support the existing efforts towards universality.

Ongoing dialogue with the four states still outside of the Treaty (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) would pave the way for accession to the Treaty when circumstances would allow. It would likewise engage these states in a systematic and constructive way, allowing all states parties to the NPT to actively participate in a process towards universality - to which all are committed. Indeed, if the international or respective regional situations were to deteriorate, it would be even more important to already have set in place a mechanism through which these states could discuss relevant issues with NPT states parties.

This mechanism could be useful at a time when the situations in the Middle East and South Asia are particularly difficult.

High Level Consultation Meeting

Our delegation proposes that there should be an annual high-level meeting between representatives of the NPT States parties and the four countries still outside of the Treaty. This interaction would be based on an understanding that ongoing consultation and dialogue is needed in order to resolve outstanding issues preventing these countries from acceding at an early date.

The interaction would necessarily be a reciprocal exchange of ideas and views regarding the possible membership of the four. In this engagement, state parties of the NPT would present arguments on the benefits of NPT membership. Likewise, the four would be asked to provide information to States parties on their needs and ideas regarding their possible membership in the Treaty. A "finger pointing" exercise assigning blame would be avoided at all costs. The goal would be to promote meaningful dialogue between NPT members and non-members.

Specifically, this would entail:

- A yearly invitation by the depository States of the NPT to the four non-states parties to discuss NPT-related concerns in a high-level forum;
- The meeting would be convened and chaired by the current Chairman of the respective PrepCom or RevCon;
- Participants would include the Depositary States, the three PrepCom Chairs, the RevCon Chair of the respective five-yearly cycle of the NPT review process, and the four non-states parties on an individual basis;
- Ideally, this consultation would take place within the three months preceding a PrepCom or RevCon;
- In the "off year" in which a PrepCom or RevCon did not take place, the Chairman of the previous RevCon would chair the meeting.
- Further details would be subject and open to suggestion and agreement by States parties.

It is acknowledged that each State outside of the Treaty has a unique political and security context, which would be appropriately taken into consideration in the consultation mechanism. This exercise would require the

cooperation of all States parties to deliver a simple but coherent message - that the universality of the NPT is in the interest of every nation of the world.

If this mechanism were to receive the unanimous support of delegations at this meeting of States parties, we would recommend that discussions begin immediately to make the appropriate preparations to allow this consultation mechanism to convene as soon as possible, with a second one following in the beginning of 2000. Failing consensus at this meeting, we request that the Chairman of this Preparatory Committee recommend to the Chairman of the Review Conference, that this mechanism be submitted for adoption at the RevCon session in 2000. It would then enter into effect in 2001.

The proposed language, subject to refinement and agreement is as follows:

> "Realising the importance of preserving the integrity of the Treaty, and the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting decides to establish a High Level Consultation Meeting Towards the Universality of the Treaty, and to report annually its progress to the future meetings of States parties of the Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings for consideration by States parties."

In the event that this proposal could not be agreed for adoption at this meeting, the appropriate language is proposed to be inserted in the Draft Chairman's Working paper as paragraph 5 bis as follows:

> "Realising the importance of preserving the integrity of the Treaty, and the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, the 2000 Review Conference decides to establish a High Level Consultations Meeting Towards the Universality of the Treaty, and to report annually its progress to the future meetings of States parties of the Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings for consideration by States parties."

Our delegation requests that this working paper be added to the list of official document of this PrepCom.